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APPROACHES TO TEACHING 
CONTRACTS 
ENRICHING CASE REPORTS 
ROBERT A. HILLMAN* 
Judicial opinions in contract matters often fail to reflect the intricacies of a 
dispute, the nuances of the lawyer’s strategies in court and the general realities 
of litigation.  This, of course, is not a novel point1 and many students intuit it.  
Nevertheless, the absence of supporting materials about the cases creates an 
aura of unreality about many things discussed in class.  In my contracts course, 
I emphasize this point and try to remedy it. 
When Bob Summers and I began to prepare our casebook some fifteen 
years ago,2 we decided to write to the lawyers who litigated the more recent 
cases selected for our book to ask them to share their files on the cases.  We 
have repeated the process for each of the editions.  Over the years, these 
lawyers have been incredibly cooperative and have showered us with a wealth 
of material.  Although we saw immediately that only a small fraction of the 
materials could successfully find their way into our book, the materials we 
selected (including legal briefs, other court documents, letters, transcripts, and, 
of course, actual contracts and other lawyer work-product) have greatly 
enriched our teaching of the contracts course.  The purpose of this essay is to 
explain how I have used the supplementary materials in the classroom and how 
they have enhanced students’ understanding of the cases, helped spur the 
 
* Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. 
 1. See, e.g., RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER 
READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN CASES (1978). 
 2. ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION 
(3d ed. 1997). 
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students’ interest in the issues and better prepared students for the world of 
practice of contract law. 
LEGAL BRIEFS 
The briefs included in our materials refine and expand legal arguments 
mentioned by the court.  Sometimes the briefs include effective legal 
arguments missed or ignored by the court.  Of course, briefs also help teach the 
art of advocacy by offering a sample text to analyze and criticize. 
In Vaskie v. West American Insurance Co.,3 for example, West American 
reiterated its offer of $25,000 to settle Vaskie’s tort claim against West 
American’s insured one month before the statute of limitations was to run on 
the claim. West American did not expressly place a time limit on its offer.  
Vaskie attempted to accept the offer eight days after the statute had run.4  The 
issue before the Superior Court was whether the offer had terminated because a 
reasonable time for acceptance had expired when the statute of limitations had 
run.  In reversing a summary judgment in favor of Vaskie and remanding the 
case for a factual determination of this issue, the court was undoubtedly 
persuaded by West American’s argument in its brief to the court: 
[A]lthough the Defendant’s settlement offer did not specify a time for 
acceptance, the nature of the proposed settlement agreement, the purposes of 
the parties thereto, and the relevant usages of trade all dictate that [Plaintiff] 
could not have reasonably expected that the settlement offer would be held 
open after the expiration of the Statute of Limitations, unless a timely action 
for Plaintiff’s personal injuries had been commenced.5 
Hardly a revelation, the insurance company’s argument nonetheless lends 
credence to the kind of question I often ask in analyzing opinions: what 
arguments would the student make if he or she could appeal the decision?  
Students see that in law practice they will be called upon to take positions 
much like those we discuss in class. 
A more telling point was made in defendant’s brief to the Appellate Court 
of Illinois in Forman v. Benson.6  Forman sought specific performance of 
Benson’s agreement to sell certain land.  The contract included a term that 
conditioned the sale on “seller’s approving buyer’s credit report.”7  Benson 
claimed that he was not satisfied with the report, which showed liabilities of 
$80,000 and “liquid assets” of $24,000.  In addition, Forman’s corporate tax 
return revealed a $2000 loss for the previous year.  Notwithstanding Forman’s 
dubious financial standing and the court’s recognition that Benson’s 
 
 3. 556 A.2d 436 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
 4. Id. at 437. 
 5. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 443. 
 6. 446 N.E.2d 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). 
 7. Id. at 537. 
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satisfaction with the credit report should be tested subjectively, the court held 
that Benson acted  in bad faith  in attempting to renegotiate a higher price.8  
The court concluded that “while [Benson] may have had a basis in his personal 
judgment for rejecting plaintiff’s credit . . . his attempted renegotiation 
demonstrates that his rejection was based on reasons other than plaintiff’s 
credit rating and was, therefore, in bad faith.”9 
The court apparently ignored an important point in Benson’s brief, in 
which he argued that Benson was fully justified in seeking a higher price in 
light of Benson’s greater-than-anticipated credit risk: 
The obvious innocent interpretation of any discussion of change in price or 
rates is that the Defendant saw a greater risk than anticipated and wished to 
have a greater return for that risk.  There is no evidence of duplicity on the part 
of the Defendant, although the inference is attempted to be made by the 
Plaintiff.  In any event it is clear from the facts that the seller sought additional 
financial information and examined it at length before rejecting the buyer’s 
credit.  Discussions regarding additional compensation, if any took place, 
would not necessarily suggest that the Defendant had approved the credit but 
wanted more money.10 
Notwithstanding the important substantive point made by Benson in the 
brief, the brief is not, of course, a model of effective advocacy.  In fact, it is 
difficult to imagine a more ambivalent presentation of the point that Benson 
was fully justified in rejecting the credit report and asking for a higher price 
(“the obvious innocent interpretation”; “would not necessarily suggest”).  I 
point out that language in a brief that demonstrates the author’s own 
uncertainty will rarely persuade a court.  This leads to a discussion of why 
Benson’s lawyer chose to use such language.  Here we surmise that the lawyer 
simply was ineffective or, perhaps, the lawyer actually believed that Benson 
was in bad faith.  A letter Benson’s lawyer wrote him after the court’s 
decision, which advised Benson to settle the case because Benson’s “chances 
for success [were] not substantial,” reinforces the latter conclusion.11 
 
 8. Id. at 540. 
 9. Id. 
 10. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 787. 
 11. Id.  The Summers’s and Hillman’s casebook also includes Lenawee County Bd. of 
Health v. Messerly,  331 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. 1982), which held that the purchasers of real 
property agreed to accept the risk of latent defects by virtue of the following clause: “Purchaser 
has examined this property and agrees to accept same in its present condition.” Id. at 205.  But the 
purchasers’ brief, set forth after the case, asserted a point often missed by the class: The 
purchasers may have agreed to accept the risk only of “conditions that would have been revealed 
by reasonable inspection.”  SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 907. 
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OTHER COURT DOCUMENTS 
Our casebook begins by setting forth materials tracing the dispute in White 
v. Benkowski12 from beginning to end.  The parties entered into a simple 
contract for the Benkowskis to supply water to the Whites’ home through a 
well on the Benkowskis’ property.  After the parties’ relationship deteriorated, 
the Whites claimed that the Benkowskis maliciously withheld water from 
them.  The Whites then brought a lawsuit against the Benkowskis that 
culminated in a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court mostly adverse to 
the Whites.  We present most of the supporting court documents in the case, 
including the complaint, answer, excerpts from the trial judge’s charge to the 
jury, excerpts from and a synopsis of the trial transcript, the special verdict and 
excerpts from the trial judge’s decision with respect to motions after the 
verdict.  Among other things, students learn about the requisites of a complaint 
and answer in contractual matters, the division of labor between the judge and 
jury, the methods for reviewing jury verdicts, and, perhaps most importantly, 
how cases arrive at appellate courts.  This background better prepares students 
to understand the procedural posture of cases that follow and to isolate legal 
issues that are the subject of review. 
The record in White v. Benkowski also helps acquaint students with the 
sometimes-concealed realities of litigation.  For example, students learn about 
the nature of judging, the shortcomings of some judges and the role and 
importance of appellate courts.  Remarkably, the trial judge made several 
rulings with respect to the availability of punitive damages in contracts cases, 
all of them incorrect.  First, he charged the jury that the Whites could recover 
punitive damages on a contract theory when the breach was malicious.13  Next, 
he submitted a special verdict form to the jury allowing for punitive damages.  
Finally, the judge reversed himself  in deciding a motion after the verdict and 
held that punitive damages, although in his view generally available for 
malicious breach of contract, were not awardable to the Whites because they 
proved only nominal  damages.14  The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the 
denial of punitive damages, but on the ground that punitive damages cannot be 
awarded in a contracts case under any circumstances.15  Adding insult to 
injury, the court referred to the “overwhelming weight of authority” to this 
effect.16 
Although I stress that lawyers do not always confront poorly informed or 
headstrong judges, students learn from the outset that judges are not 
 
 12. 155 N.W.2d 74 (Wis. 1967). 
 13. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 22. 
 14. Id. 
 15. White, 155 N.W.2d at 77. 
 16. Id. 
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automatons that apply the law to a set of facts and spit out correct resolutions.  
In fact, sometime they do not even apply the appropriate rule! 
The record in White v. Benkowski also exposes the complexities of contract 
breakdown and what lawyers can and cannot do to avert disputes.  For 
example, the agreement in the case broke down partially because of a dispute 
over water usage.  The agreement was not drafted by lawyers and we discuss 
how lawyers could have drafted language pertaining to water usage that might 
have helped to avoid the dispute.  On the other hand, the trial transcript reveals 
that the parties simply could not get along, a matter almost completely missing 
from the court’s report of the facts.17  The nature of the parties’ quarreling 
captures the students’ imagination, increases their interest in the case and alerts 
them to the special challenges of a planning lawyer: 
Gwynneth [White] testified that the relationship of the families was good 
until . . . the Whites’ daughter picked an apple in the Benkowskis’ yard.  Ruth 
Benkowski then called the daughter an “S.O.B.” Gwynneth told Ruth that “she 
didn’t like this.” Later, Ruth called Gwynneth “a redheaded bitch.”  Virgil 
White stated that Paul Benkowski lodged a complaint with Virgil’s superior 
that Virgil had tried to run over Paul’s child.  The district attorney’s 
investigation absolved Virgil.  Paul Benkowski also complained to the police 
chief that Virgil . . . had wild parties at home.  Virgil was again absolved of 
any wrongdoing.18 
We include various court documents from cases other than White v. 
Benkowski as well.  For example, we include excerpts from the deposition of 
the insured Vaskie’s lawyer in the Vaskie case.  Recall that Vaskie sought to 
accept an offer of settlement from West American after the statute of 
limitations had run.  Quite dramatically, the deposition reveals a lawyer 
attempting to fight off insinuations of malpractice from West American for 
failing to advise Vaskie to accept the settlement offer before the statute of 
limitations had run.  The air of reality and the stakes for the lawyer rivet the 
attention of students to the facts and legal issues in the case.19 
LETTERS FROM LAWYERS 
We include lots of letters from the litigating lawyers in cases in our book.  
Some of the most interesting are cover letters written to us in response to our 
request for materials.  These letters often include additional details and insights 
 
 17. The court reports only that the parties relationship had “deteriorated.”  Id. at 75. 
 18. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra  note 2, at 17. 
 19. We also include excerpts from the defendant’s amended findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in Baker v. Bailey, 782 P.2d 1286 (Mont. 1989), which illustrate a role of litigating 
lawyers, often hidden from the students, namely that lawyers prepare what they believe should be 
the court’s findings of fact and legal conclusions and that judges can pick and choose from these 
offerings. 
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about the cases.  For example, West American’s lawyer in the Vaskie case 
wrote to tell us that the case was settled for “$15,000, in compromise of the 
full claim of $25,000.”20  The letter also revealed that Vaskie’s lawyer, who 
was also her cousin, paid the difference to her (suggesting, of course, the 
questionable representation offered by the lawyer).  Further, the letter shows 
how rules emanating from cases influence lawyers’ advice to clients: 
We have since advised West American and a number of our other insurance 
company clients that they should set a definite date when their settle-offers 
would expire, rather than leaving them open-ended, as was the case in the 
instant matter.21 
In Hield v. Thyberg,22 the court allowed purchaser Hield to introduce 
evidence that the parties intended the $15,000 purchase price of a half-interest 
in a corporation to mean “$15,000 cash at closing and $35,000 in a promissory 
note.”23  The following letter from Thyberg’s attorney cannot help but 
reinforce students’ suspicion about the leakiness of the parol evidence rule: 
As a result of this case, we have concluded that virtually no written contract is 
safe from attack regardless of the clarity of its wording.  It appears that anyone 
wishing to escape the consequences of a written contract can get to the jury 
with an argument that there was a parol agreement for something which is 
directly at variance with the terms of the written contract since it does not seem 
difficult to be able to show some latent ambiguity or lack of integration.24 
Noroski v. Fallet25 involved whether Noroski agreed to $754.40 as the full 
settlement of his claim resulting from injuries sustained in an automobile 
accident.  Noroski had agreed to that amount during the following telephone 
conversation with the defendant’s insurance company: “Do you agree that the 
draft I will be sending you in the total amount of $754.40 is the full and 
complete settlement for your bodily injuries as well as the property damage 
resulting from this accident?  A. Yes.”26  The court held that the conversation 
did not constitute a release because Noroski did not understand that it 
constituted a release of future as well as present claims.27  Drawing on this 
case, Fallet’s lawyer’s letter to us emphasized the uncertainties of litigation 
and contained an additional insight for students: 
What strikes me as being of particular significance in this case and which is 
difficult for laymen to comprehend, is that a total of eleven judges reviewed 
 
 20. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 444. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 347 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. 1984). 
 23. Id. at 505. 
 24. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 698-99. 
 25. 442 N.E.2d 1302 (Ohio 1982). 
 26. Id. at 1304. 
 27. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] ENRICHING CASE REPORTS 1203 
the evidence in this case [in the trial and appellate courts].  Presumably, all are 
applying the same legal principles to the same set of facts.  Yet, seven of the 
judges felt there was a valid and binding release which terminated the 
plaintiff’s ability to further prosecute a personal injury claim against the 
defendant.  A minority of four of the judges, who unfortunately for my client, 
comprised the majority of the seven Ohio Supreme Court justices, felt there 
was no contract whatsoever because there was no meeting of the minds. 
Thus, this case is a good object lesson to clients as to the uncertainties of 
litigation (as well as perhaps providing comfort to law students who felt that 
their examination answers were also correct).28 
Other letters in our book come from the files of the case, such as 
communications to opposing counsel or to clients.  For an example of the 
latter, consider the letter referred to earlier written by Benson’s lawyer to his 
client, which advised Benson to settle the case because his “chances for 
success [were] not substantial.”29  The letter illustrates how lawyers advise 
clients, allows for a critique of these methods, and, as pointed out earlier, 
offers an explanation for why a lawyer pursued a particular strategy in a case. 
DOCUMENTS FROM PRACTICE 
Our book includes documents from practice such as contracts or terms 
(both business and personal), assignments and deeds.  To acquaint students 
with real-world drafting issues, I ask them to evaluate whether these 
documents achieved their purposes.  For example, the contract in Lewis v. 
Carnaggio30 is particularly helpful in demonstrating the crucial importance of 
clear drafting, including the need for correct grammar.  In that case, the party’s 
placement of one comma determined the outcome of their litigation.31 
The actual contract in White v. Benkowski, drawn by a real estate broker 
using a form book, sheds light on several aspects of contract practice.  For 
example, students, who study the White and Benkowski contract on the first 
day of class, are struck by the truth that this document, created by the parties in 
order to achieve their goals, constitutes law that is “just as effective a means of 
creating or transferring rights . . . as the most solemn enactments of a 
legislature.”32  In addition, students begin to think about parties’ motives for 
entering contracts, the importance of allocating risks and the efficiency of 
contract.  Perhaps most important, by focusing on the actual contract, the 
teacher can present one important framework for analyzing the rest of the cases 
 
 28. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 911. 
 29. Id. at 787. 
 30. 183 S.E.2d 899 (S.C. 1971). 
 31. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 724. 
 32. David Cavers, Legal Education and Lawyer-Made Law, 54 W. VA. L. REV. 177, 179 
(1952), quoted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra  note 2, at 4. 
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in the book, namely the planning lawyer perspective.  For example, why did 
this contract fail to protect the parties from litigation?  What should the 
contract have contained that might have helped the parties to avoid 
breakdown?  Would a lawyer, who is trained to plan and draft contracts, have 
produced a more adequate contract? 
This last question is not meant to instigate a discussion that is merely 
propaganda for the legal industry.  I also ask why the parties did not hire a 
lawyer, which leads to a nice discussion of the cost of legal advice, the 
potential for lawyers to upset the deal and the tendency of many parties to 
prefer informal relations.33 
CONCLUSION 
This essay stresses the pedagogical utility of supplementing case reports 
with supporting materials.  I do not mean to suggest that the strategies 
discussed herein constitute the most important aspect of a contract law course 
or even that they are essential.  However, they do enrich the contracts course. 
The discussion above focuses on the use of supplementary materials to 
enrich students’ understanding of the practice of contract law, but I want to 
close by pointing out that the materials contribute to an understanding of the 
theoretical as well.  For example, the study of actual contracts helps 
demonstrate that law consists of more than enactments of officials in power.34  
The comments of the lawyers in Hield v. Thyberg and Noroski v. Fallet35 
highlight the relative indeterminacy of at least some legal rules and the 
similarities between rules and standards, as they are expanded or narrowed 
respectively by judicial interpretation and application.  Benson’s brief sheds 
light on the meaning of good faith.36  The brief and letters in Vaskie v. West 
American Insurance Co.37 emphasize how parties bargain “in the shadow” of 
contract law.  No doubt the teacher employing supplementary materials can 
find numerous other uses of such materials to illuminate both the practice and 
theory of contract law. 
 
 
 33. I call the latter two points the “Rollie” principle, in light of the following revealing 
quotation from Rollie Massimino, a former head coach of Villanova University’s basketball team, 
who explained why he declined an offer from the New Jersey Nets: “The Nets were very 
professional in all their dealings.  We had some twenty telephone conversations and about five 
face-to-face meetings.  Everything was agreed on verbally and then the lawyers took over with 
their legalese and there were snags.”  SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 8, quoting ITHACA 
JOURNAL, June 26, 1985, at 16. 
 34. But see J. AUSTIN, I LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 180-85, 225-26 (4th ed.  1873), 
discussed in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 2, at 7. 
 35. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text. 
 36. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. 
 37. See supra notes 3-4, 15 and accompanying text. 
